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Recently, the issue of tort recovery against individuals and national
governments by victims of international humanitarian law violations has entered
the international spotlight. Victims of Japanese atrocities during World War II
have filed actions in Japanese courts to obtain compensation.1 Victims of
Soviet World War II atrocities have sought redress against Russia in a U.S.
district court.2 A Bosnian victim of Serbian atrocities has attempted to obtain
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1. Eight Dutch Citizens Sue Japan Over War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at A9; Former Dutch
'Comfort Women' to File Compensation Suit, Japan Economic Newswire, Jan. 21, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Jen File; Hong Kong War Victims Prepare Law Suit Against Japan, Japan
Economic Newswire, July 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Jen File; Lian Nemenzo, Comfort
Women Seek Compensation, Inter Press Service, Mar. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres
File.
In January 1995, more than 20,000 plaintiffs from five nations filed a mass suit in Tokyo. Teresa
Ooi, 1,000 Aussie Victims of WWIIJoin Suit Against Japan, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Jan. 17, 1995,
at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Strait File. The suit alleged Japanese mistreatment of the
plaintiffs in World War II prison and internment camps and claimed more than $700 million (U.S.) in
damages. Id.
In April 1995, 41 Chinese plaintiffs submitted demands to the Japanese government for apologies
and compensation for various crimes committed by Japanese forces during World War II. 1st Group
of China War Victims to Seek Compensation, Japan Economic Newswire, April 26, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Jcn File. The plaintiffs expect to file their claims in a Japanese court. Id.
2. Stephen Schwartz, Polish Americans Sue Over Stalin-Era Killings, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 1993,
at A16. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the Russian Federation enjoys immunity from all
acts committed by its predecessor government prior to 1952, when the U.S. State Department
abandoned its policy of supporting absolute sovereign immunity for foreign states in U.S. courts. Suit
Against Russian Government Tossed Out, UPI, June 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI
File.
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money damages and injunctive relief in a U.S. district court against a Bosnian
Serb leader who allegedly ordered acts of murder, rape, torture, forced
prostitution, and forced impregnation.3 Although none of these actions names
the United States or U.S. military personnel as defendants, one commentator
has already suggested that Laotian civilians injured by the U.S. bombing
campaign in Laos during the Vietnam War might be able to recover in
administrative proceedings against the U.S. government.4
Is it possible for foreign nationals to recover damages from the U.S.
government in U.S. courts or administrative bodies for injuries suffered as a
result of law of war violations by U.S. service members? Alternatively, can
foreign victims recover against individual U.S. service members? An examina-
tion of U.S. tort law and immunities reveals that such plaintiffs would be able
to recover against the U.S. government only under rare circumstances. Actions
against individual service members would be at least as difficult to sustain, even
in the unlikely event that a solvent, individual defendant could be identified.
In the 1951 Law and Contemporary Problems symposium entitled "War
Claims," Professor Quincy Wright recommended that the international law
respecting war claims be reshaped to promote greater respect for law and
human rights. 5  Professor Wright believed that all combat-related damages
should be compensated through "national or international plans for recovery"
rather than through "individual claims against any government," because, in his
view, the primary purpose of war claims was to finance reconstruction, not to
apportion blame for combat damages. 6 With respect to most combat damages,
Professor Wright was entirely correct. However, regarding damages arising
from violations of the laws of war, individual claims can have a vital role to play
in the enforcement system.
This note proposes that victims of war crimes be permitted to recover
against the U.S. government through administrative procedures similar to those
of the Foreign Claims Act (the "FCA").7 Extending the U.S. military claims
system to victims of war crimes would serve purposes as vital as those already
served by the FCA. Victims of war crimes would have an opportunity to air
3. Kadic v. Karadzic, Nos. 93 Civ. 0878 (filed Feb. 11, 1993), 93 Civ. 1163 (filed Mar. 2, 1993)
(copy of complaint on file with author), dismissed sub nom Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y.
1994). The court dismissed the case on the ground that the defendant, as leader of the Bosnian Serb
militia, was not acting under the color of law of any recognized country, as required under the U.S.
alien tort laws. Doe, 866 F.Supp. at 740-41. The plaintiffs have appealed the dismissal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Grant McCool, Attorneys Appeal Ruling in Karadzic Lawsuit,
Reuters World Service, June 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
4. Kenneth P. Kingshill, Comment, Present-Day Effects of United States Bombing of Laos During
the Vietnam War: Can Injured Laotians Recover Under the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 13 LoY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 133 (1990). Kingshill concludes that Laotian bombing victims can recover under
the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988), only because the peculiar circumstances of their tort
fit into a "loophole" in the act. Kingshill, supra, at 174.
5. Quincy Wright, War Claims: What of the Future?, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 543, 549
(Summer 1951).
6. Id at 550.
7. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988).
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grievances and to be compensated, just as foreign victims of peacetime crimes
by U.S. service members are compensated through the existing claims system.
The proposed claims system would provide the U.S. military with an additional
method of alerting senior operational leaders to evidence of war crimes.
Commanders then would have greater opportunity to investigate and prosecute
the offenders in the military justice system. By quickly satisfying the claims of
war crimes victims in administrative proceedings, the United States might be
better able to retain criminal jurisdiction over its own soldiers, rather than have
them tried in international tribunals. Most importantly, providing war crimes
victims access to a responsive and efficient compensation system would enhance
the nation's image as a defender of human rights and the rule of law.
Part II of this note briefly examines the development of international law
and procedure regarding war crimes and war claims, and argues that the two
bodies of law are becoming more closely related. Part III examines bases for
jurisdiction over war crimes claims in the U.S. court system and concludes that
such jurisdiction has a legal basis. Part IV analyzes the impact of U.S. sovereign
immunity law on war crimes claims and concludes that federal law precludes
virtually any possibility of a successful claim against the U.S. government or
against individual war criminals. Part V suggests a solution that may allow for
compensation of war crimes victims without any great adverse effects. Part VI
concludes that a system for compensating foreign victims of U.S. war crimes
would serve valuable purposes, including the demonstration of U.S. commitment
to the international rule of law.
II
BACKGROUND: THE LAW OF WAR AND WAR CLAIMS
While international law theoretically has mandated restitution to war crimes
victims for some time, individuals have not frequently sought such restitution
until recently. By contrast, crime victims in various domestic law systems have
enjoyed and exercised a right to restitution for centuries.' This section provides
some background on the body of international law governing war crimes and
tort claims and sets forth some practical reasons why, in view of recent
international trends, the two legal regimes should be considered in tandem.
A. The Law of War and Its Enforcement
Over the centuries, the nations of the world have developed an extensive
body of international law governing the behavior of military personnel in times
8. For an historical overview and comparative analysis of crime victim restitution in the U.S. and
Australia, see Maxine D. Kersh, Comment, The Empowerment of the Crime Victim: A Comparative
Study of Victim Compensation Schemes in the United States and Australia, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 345
(1994).
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of armed conflict.9 Underlying this body of law is the principle that it is
important to limit the cruelty of war by placing certain legal constraints on
political and military leaders as well as on common soldiers.10 As with any
other body of law, the effectiveness of the international law of war and of
related human rights precepts1 depends upon the availability and application
of enforcement mechanisms.
The primary method of enforcing the law of war has been criminal
prosecution of suspected war criminals in national criminal justice systems.
Although there have been many successful criminal prosecutions in this
century,12 the success of this method depends on the ability and willingness of
the prosecuting state to both capture enemy war criminals and prosecute its own
soldiers for war crimes. Moreover, even in the most egregious atrocity cases,
9. The international humanitarian law of armed conflict, more commonly referred to as "the law
of war," is the oldest branch of international law, having existed in some form since ancient times.
Rules governing warfare have existed in all of the world's major civilizations. DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR 1-2 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS];
G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODERN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 7 (1973).
During the 15th through 17th centuries, writers such as Hugo Grotius systematically reduced customary
international standards of warfare to written form. Id. at 2. During the late 19th century, nations began
to codify the laws of war as a system of international conventions. See, e.g., Declaration Respecting
Maritime Law, April 16, 1856, 15 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 791. In 1899, the First Hague
Peace Conference completed the world's first widely ratified, comprehensive codification of rules
governing land warfare. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex
of Regulations (Hague II), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 949;
DOCUMENTS, supra, at 43. The 1907 revision of the Hague Convention II, Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of Regulations (Hague IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461, is widely recognized as an authoritative
codification of rules governing the conduct of land warfare. DOCUMENTS, supra, at 44.
After the Second World War, an international conference in Geneva concluded four conventions
designed to protect the victims of war, specifically the wounded and sick on land, the wounded, sick,
and shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians. Id. at 169-337. The four Geneva conventions
have been so widely ratified that their principles are considered to be declaratory of customary
international law and therefore binding even on the few states that have not ratified the conventions.
Id at 170.
Even after the codifications, the customary law of war remains vital. The Hague and Geneva
conventions contain clauses affirming the continued obligation of all nations to observe the customary
principles of international law. Id. at 4. The charters establishing the international military tribunals
that tried the major German and Japanese war criminals after the Second World War derived their
principles from customary international law. 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 254 (1947).
10. DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (2d ed. 1981).
11. Other international human rights conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
also apply to combat activities.
12. For instance, after World War I the victorious Allies prosecuted hundreds of Germans for war
crimes, and the German government, under Allied pressure, also tried suspected German war criminals.
JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR
CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 130, 142 (1982). National military courts carried out most of
the war-crimes prosecutions conducted after World War II. DOCUMENTS, supra note 9, at 6. National
military courts have also tried their own soldiers, under applicable military criminal codes, for offenses
that constitute war crimes. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND ITS
COVER-UP: BEYOND THE REACH OF LAW? 459-74 (1976) (excerpting cases in which the U.S.
prosecuted Vietnam War criminals).
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national military justice systems often fail. For example, the well-publicized and
-documented My Lai atrocity 3 resulted in only one conviction among the thirty
U.S. soldiers suspected of involvement in the murders.' That soldier,
Lieutenant William Calley, was convicted of the premeditated murder of not
less than twenty Vietnamese civilians, 5 but he ultimately served only four
years in prison. 6 In another case, four U.S. soldiers who were eventually
convicted of kidnapping, raping, and murdering a young Vietnamese civilian
benefitted at trial from the glowing character testimony of their superiors,
despite the substantial weight of evidence against them and the confession of
one of the defendants. 7 All were convicted, but after new trials and sympa-
thetic military review boards, their prison terms ultimately ranged from one to
four years.1 8
International tribunals, such as the trials of the German and Japanese war
criminals after the Second World War, are perhaps the best-known instances of
law of war enforcement. However, such tribunals usually result from the
distinct circumstances that follow particular conflicts. For instance, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals would not have been possible without the
unconditional surrender of the Axis powers at the end of the Second World
War. Another international tribunal, the International Court of Justice in the
Netherlands, hears civil and criminal cases involving war crimes, 9 but it only
considers cases involving states as parties, and it relies on the voluntary
submission of member states to its jurisdiction. The United States no longer
submits to that jurisdiction.' °
Efforts to institutionalize a judicial enforcement mechanism for law of war
enforcement continue. The United Nations has sponsored the creation of an ad
hoc international criminal tribunal to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes in the
former Yugoslavia.' The mission of the tribunal has been extended to the
prosecution of atrocities committed during the 1994 Rwandan civil war.22
Meanwhile, the United Nations is also debating the establishment of a
permanent international criminal tribunal, which would have jurisdiction over
13. The My Lai case and the rape-murder case discussed below were not actually "war crimes"
within the scope of the Geneva Conventions, since they were perpetrated by U.S. soldiers against
civilians of a friendly nation-the Republic of Vietnam. They are included in this discussion because
they are among the best-documented recent examples of major atrocities by U.S. soldiers and because
they illustrate limitations of the military justice system applicable to true war crime cases.
14. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 3.
15. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1172 (C.M.R. 1973).
16. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at x-xi.
17. DANIEL LANG, CASUALTIES OF WAR 93-97 (1969).
18. Id at 100-01, 110-14, 118-19.
19. See, e.g., Bob Bergen, World Court to Hear Rape-Genocide Argument, CALGARY HERALD, Mar.
24, 1994, at A18.
20. The U.S. withdrew from the International Court of Justice's compulsory jurisdiction in 1985.
Bernard Weinraub, U.S. Limits its Role at Court in Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1985, at AS.
21. Juliet O'Neill, The Hague Will Be the New Nuremberg: Alleged Atrocities in ex-Yugoslavia to
be Aired Here, VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 5, 1994, at A1O.
22. U.N. Appoints Prosecutor for Rwandan Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at A6.
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war crimes.' The proposal is stalled in the Security Council, and there
appears to be no international consensus on the desirability of creating a
permanent, international court with jurisdiction over human rights offenses.'
In any event, the absence of an international police authority limits the success
of any international criminal tribunal to the willingness of states to turn over
suspects to the court.'
B. International Tort Claims
It is a basic premise of international law that states, not individuals, are its
subjects.' Therefore, an individual injured by a foreign state must, under the
traditional rules, subordinate his claim to his state of citizenship.27 Moreover,
the principle of sovereign immunity prevents states from being sued in foreign
courts without their consent and removes state-to-state tort actions to the realm
of diplomacy.' The combined effect of these traditional rules has made it very
difficult for individuals to pursue tort claims against foreign states.
The customary international norms can be relaxed, however, by the consent
of individual states. During World War I, the United States conducted its first
extended military operation on the soil of an ally (in that case, France). The
large number of U.S. troops naturally generated a substantial number of
damages claims by French nationals, which in turn created friction between the
U.S and French governments. To defuse the tension, Congress enacted a tort
claims act,29 which became a great success."0 During World War II, Congress
enacted the FCA.1 The FCA has been quite successful in helping the United
States maintain good relations with the populations and governments of allied
nations hosting U.S. military forces, 2 but it makes no provision for claims
23. Id.; see also American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court, Final
Report, 28 INT'L LAW. 475 (1994).
24. Raymond Bonner, U.N. Commission Recommends Rwanda "Genocide" Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 1994, at A13; Barbara Crossette, Rwanda Asks Quick Start of Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1994, at A19.
25. American Bar Association Task Force, supra note 23, at 486-88. Under all three alternative
versions of Article 23 of the Draft Statute for the permanent tribunal, states would have the option to
completely or partially opt out of the tribunal's jurisdiction. Id at 516-17.
26. RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL
COMMISSIONS 5 (1962).
27. Id.
28. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 325-26 (4th ed. 1990).
29. Act of April 18, 1918, ch. 57, 40 Stat. 532.
30. More than 38,000 claims were paid under the act in 1918 and 1919. Major William R. Mullins,
The International Responsibility of a State for Torts of Its Military Forces, 34 MIL. L. REV. 59, 63 n.21
(1966).
31. Act of January 2, 1942, ch. 645, 55 Stat. 880 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988)).
32. See infra part IV.
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arising out of combat operations or for tort victims who happen to be citizens
of "unfriendly" states. 33
C. Applying Tort Principles to War Crimes
Even if the current trends toward increased use of international claims courts
and criminal tribunals continue, the suitability of such tribunals for compensat-
ing individual victims of war crimes or for achieving justice in individual cases
is doubtful. International claims proceedings are an expensive, time-consuming,
and unwieldy method of redressing grievances. The limited resources of
international criminal tribunals probably will be forever reserved for "major"
war criminals, such as military and political leaders. 34 Moreover, the prospect
of having U.S. service members tried before international tribunals is certainly
not attractive for the citizens or political leaders of the United States. Thus,
there is likely to be substantial domestic opposition to giving such tribunals
jurisdiction over accused U.S. citizens.
Therefore, U.S. citizens should seek to ensure that the U.S. judicial system
provides adequate remedies for war crime victims. If the United States were to
create an effective remedy for war crimes victims, the well-established
international law rule of exhaustion of local remedies35 would shield the United
States from expensive and politically troublesome international claims litigation.
In view of the U.S. military justice system's uneven record of effectiveness in




A. Choice of Remedy
If the tort in question stems from an act or omission in the United States,
plaintiffs might seek remedies under the tort law of the appropriate U.S.
jurisdiction. Such torts might result from operational decisions, which, through
negligence, recklessness, or intent, lead to war crimes. Such cases would
probably be uncommon, however, and as discussed below, the Federal Tort
Claims Act would severely restrict their viability.
33. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
34. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia will focus its efforts on major
war criminals and "crimes against humanity," rather than individual perpetrators of crimes such as
murder and rape. Remarks of Judge Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, at Duke University, Durham, NC, Nov. 5, 1994.
35. "A claim will not be admissible on the international plane unless the individual alien or
corporation concerned has exhausted the legal remedies available to him in the state which is the
alleged author of injury." BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 494-95. The rule does not apply if no effective
remedies are deemed available in the defendant state; for instance, if the courts in that state are
prevented by a dictatorial ruler from affording relief to a foreign plaintiff. Id. at 497-98.
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Potential litigants are far more likely to seek remedies under the internation-
al law of war. Since international law has the force of federal law in U.S.
courts,36 suing under international law would raise none of the troubling legal
issues otherwise inherent in cases arising abroad, such as the unwillingness of
federal courts to apply foreign law in suits against the United States and the
applicability of U.S. tort law to foreign cases.
However, it is disputed whether private remedies are available for
international law violations. 37  The Restatement rule is that international
agreements generally do not provide remedies to private parties. However,
private remedies might be available, subject to interpretation of the internation-
al agreement in question.38 A customary international law principle that has
become part of U.S. law may also provide a remedy in U.S. courts. 39 Whether
such a principle may become part of U.S. law may depend on the usage of
nations, judicial opinions, and secondary works.'
The case law suggests that the Restatement exception may swallow the rule.
When international law principles have been properly invoked by tort plaintiffs
in U.S. courts, federal judges have rarely denied them a cause of action. It is
true that courts have refused to recognize a cause of action for torts caused by
lawful belligerent acts." However, since the eighteenth century, U.S. courts
have frequently recognized the rights of private litigants to make claims for
violations of international law.42
B. Jurisdiction
The Alien Tort Statute enacted by the First Congress grants federal courts
original jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."43 As one
federal court has observed, courts have subjected Alien Tort Statute claims to
exacting scrutiny due to the jurisdictional requirement that a "violation of the
36. Ratified treaties have the force of federal law. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Customary international
law is also effective as federal law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
37. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,810 (D.C. Cir 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (the
Geneva Conventions do not provide a private cause of action), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). But
see Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in US. History and the Right
to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 628-50 (1989) (arguing that the
Tel-Oren opinion ignored centuries of contrary U.S. case law).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; see also id. § 703, cmt. c.
39. Idt § 907 & cmt. a.
40. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
41. E.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,253 (1897) ("[Alcts of legitimate warfare cannot be
made the basis of individual liability.").
42. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884-85. For numerous additional examples, see Paust, supra note
37, at 620 n.501.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). In 1992 Congress amended the statute to codify the private right of
action of torture victims first expressed in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884-85. Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988)).
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law of nations" be demonstrated.' Such claims are subject to a preliminary
factual review to determine whether an international law violation has occurred,
but when such a violation is properly pleaded, jurisdiction will be upheld.45
C. Justiciability
Tort actions arising from authorized military operations also raise justiciabili-
ty questions under the political question doctrine, which prevents the judiciary
from interfering with policy judgments that are constitutionally committed to the
executive or legislative branches.' Federal courts have dismissed some claims
arising out of military operations as nonjusticiable by their very nature.47 Such
decisions ignore the judiciary's historical willingness to entertain cases involving
military injury to civilians, even in wartime.48 Recent decisions demonstrate
a thoughtful approach, distinguishing between damage actions and actions
seeking injunctive relief. In Koohi v. United States,49 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in dictum the history of
successful damage claims arising out of military operations and reasoned that
actions for damages "will not draw the federal courts into conflict with the
executive branch."5 Other courts have reached the same result by distinguish-
ing between injunctive actions, which raise the threat of direct judicial control
over executive decisions, and damage actions, which compensate civilian victims
with minimal interference in executive policy decisions. 1 Therefore, there is




It has long been settled under U.S. law that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which immunizes a government from suit unless it consents, applies
to the U.S. government.52 There are two federal waiver-of-immunity statutes
under which foreign victims of war crimes might attempt to sue the U.S.
government in U.S. courts: the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA")53 and
the FCA.54 Further examination reveals that both the FTCA and the FCA
44. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887-88.
45. Id.
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
47. Eminente v. Johnson, 361 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 929 (1966).
48. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
49. 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2928 (1993).
50. Id. at 1332.
51. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated
on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
52. United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846).
53. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 843 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
54. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988).
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contain exceptions that preclude virtually all actions by foreign war crimes
victims injured abroad.
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act
For most potential war crime victim-plaintiffs, the preferred defendant will
be the U.S. government, since the chances of recovering on a judgment against
the government are much better than against an individual defendant. The
FTCA is the principal U.S. statute under which the U.S. government consents
to suit. Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for tort claims "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances," but not generally for punitive damages.55 It contains four
exceptions, however, that could affect the viability of claims by war crimes
victims: the assault and battery exception;56 the combatant activities excep-
tion;57 the foreign country exception;58 and the discretionary function excep-
tion.59 Together, these exceptions make it extremely difficult for a war crime
victim to state a case in U.S. courts.'
1. The "Assault and Battery" Exception. Section 2680(h) of the FTCA
immunizes the government from "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery," or
certain other intentional torts. Since many war crimes, such as intentional
shootings or rapes, might be characterized as batteries, the government could
claim immunity under this section. Indeed, the plain language of the exception
bars claims arising solely from an assault or battery.61 Therefore, the govern-
ment will not be liable for a battery committed by an employee merely on a
respondeat superior theory. However, there is considerable doubt whether the
exception bars all claims involving assaults or batteries by government
employees. In Sheridan v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
tort action arising out of a battery by a government employee is not barred
when there is a basis for negligence liability independent of the batterer's
government employment status. 62  However, the Sheridan majority did not
decide whether torts arising both from battery and from factors dependent on
that batterer's government employment status, such as negligent selection or
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). In wrongful death cases arising in jurisdictions where punitive damages
are the only remedy, the United States is liable for actual or compensatory damages in lieu of punitives.
Id.
56. Id § 2680(h).
57. Id § 26800).
58. Id § 2680(k).
59. Id. § 2680(a).
60. I am indebted in my analysis to Kenneth Kingshill, supra note 4, who first analyzed the
applicability of some of these FICA exceptions in the context of possible actions by Laotian bombing
victims.
61. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 398 (1988).
62. For instance, independent liability exists when Navy corpsmen discover that a drunken
serviceman is carrying an unauthorized firearm, and they allow that serviceman to keep his firearm,
which he then uses to shoot a passing civilian. Id at 402-03.
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supervision of the battering employee, fall within the exception.6 The
Sheridan dissent argued that allowing a tort claim against the government for
negligent selection or supervision would destroy the very core of the assault and
battery exception.6'
The failure of the Supreme Court to address the employment-related
negligence issue leaves intact the conflicting decisions of the U.S. courts of
appeals, most of which hold that the exception bars all negligence claims against
the government in cases involving battery.' Therefore, until the Supreme
Court or Congress clarifies the meaning of the exception, any tort suits for
damages resulting from batteries by government employees will be barred in
most federal courts.
2. The "Combatant Activities During Time of War" Exception. The
exception most obviously affecting war crimes tort claims is that of section
26806), which immunizes the government from "[a]ny claim arising out of the
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during
time of war." 66  The subsection raises two interpretive questions: what
constitutes "time of war," and what are "combatant activities"? Unfortunately,
the legislative history of the FTCA is not helpful in interpreting this subsec-
67tion.
a. "Time of War." Federal courts have rejected the contention that "time
of war" for purposes of this and other statutes refers only to declared war. In
one FTCA claim, a district court held simply that the Vietnam War, even
though undeclared, constituted a war for purposes of the combatant activities
exception.' One commentator 69 has suggested that other courts might follow
the more exacting analysis of Orlando v. Laird" and evaluate the constitution-
ality of the underlying conflict in order to determine whether a "state of war"
exists.
However, in a recent case arising out of the Persian Gulf "Tanker War" of
the 1980s, Koohi v. Unites States, the United States Court of Appeals for the
63. Id at 403 n.8.
64. I at 411.
65. Kathleen de Jonge, Note, Recovery Under the Federal Tort Claims Act for Government
Negligence Which Leads to an Intentional Tort by a Government Employee, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 497, 499
(1988).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1988).
67. H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945), merely states that the exception "exempts
from the bill claims arising out of the activities of the military or naval forces or the Coast Guard during
time of war." See also Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2928 (1993).
68. Morrison v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 78, 79 (M.D. Ga. 1970).
69. Kingshill, supra note 4, at 167-68.
70. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.) (holding that, for purposes of a challenge to executive authority to order
soldiers into combat, the U.S. military action in Vietnam was sufficiently ratified by Congress and was
therefore constitutionally proper), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
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Ninth Circuit failed to apply the Orlando standard to the FrCA.7 1 The case
arose out of the destruction of an Iranian civilian airliner by the U.S. warship
Vincennes during the Iran-Iraq war. The court concluded that the U.S. effort
to protect Persian Gulf shipping during that war constituted a "time of war" for
purposes of the combatant activities exception, regardless of the existence or
degree of congressional authorization for the military action.72 In the court's
view, "time of war" for FTCA purposes was purely a matter of military reality,
subject only to executive authorization, and had nothing to do with Orlando's
constitutional analysis:
In sum, we have no difficulty in concluding that when, as a result of a deliberate
decision by the executive branch, United States armed forces engage in an organized
series of hostile encounters on a significant scale with the military forces of another
nation, the FTCA [combatant activities] exception applies. Under those circumstances,
a "time of war" exists, at least for purposes of domestic tort law.73
To justify this expansive interpretation of the exception, the court reasoned
that applying the exception to negligent conduct during any military action
authorized by the executive would allow uses of tort law that Congress could
not have contemplated in enacting the statute. Specifically, the court expressed
a fear that waiving government immunity in a case like the Vincennes incident
(in which the crew of the U.S. warship genuinely believed that it was endan-
gered by an unidentified aircraft) would deter U.S. forces from vigorously
carrying out vital combat missions.74 Moreover, waiving immunity would
provide compensation only for a small segment of the many victims of war, and
it would apply tort law's stigma of blame to U.S. service members merely
because they had defended themselves.7" The court concluded:
For these and other reasons, tort law, in toto, is an inappropriate subject for injection
into the area of military engagements. The FTCA clearly recognizes this principle, and
we see no reason why Congress would want to differentiate in this respect between
declared and undeclared wars.76
In view of this opinion and the absence of any contrary federal case law, it
seems that the "time of war" definition will rule out the vast majority of
potential FTCA claims for damages arising from law of war violations.
However, other cases interpreting the "combatant activities" prong of the
exception seem to leave room for certain types of claims, specifically, claims
arising from tortious conduct outside the zone of combat.
b. "Combatant Activities" In an early case interpreting the meaning of
"combatant activities," a federal district court held that the exception did not
71. 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993).
72. Id. at 1333-34.
73. Id. at 1335.
74. Id. at 1334-35.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1335.
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apply to a training accident that resulted in the deaths of civilians." The court,
after consulting two dictionaries for a definition of "combatant,"78 opined:
[T]he phrase was used to denote actual conflict, such as where the planes and other
instrumentalities were being used, not in practice and training, far removed from the
zone of combat, but in bombing enemy occupied territory, forces or vessels, attacking
or defending against enemy forces, etc .... [I]n actual fighting, the attention and
energies of the military personnel would be directed and devoted to the destruction
of the enemy and its property, as well as to the protection of the lives of their own
forces, citizens and property by the use of force immediately applied.79
This interpretation would seem to exclude any violent, wartime military action
from the scope of the FTCA as a "combatant activity" so long as the action was
against enemy forces or was carried out in enemy territory. Such an interpreta-
tion would be consistent with the treatment of the "time of war" prong of the
exception.
The first appellate case to interpret the "combatant activities" exception,
Johnson v. United States,8° took an even wider view. The court, starting from
the same "physical violence" definition of combat used in the district court case,
concluded that while the exception did not apply to activities of supply ships far
from the combat zone occurring after cessation of hostilities, a supply operation
in support of a combatant would "undoubtedly [be a] 'combat activity. '
More recent case law has elaborated on the earlier interpretations of the
"combatant activities" prong of the exception. In an attempt by chemical
company defendants to implead the government into an Agent Orange suit
brought by Vietnam veterans and their families, a federal district court held that
the "combatant activities" exception does not bar plaintiffs from suing the
government for injuries resulting from the government's deliberate omission of
warning labels on chemical containers.' The court reasoned that the decision
to omit the warning labels did not arise from "combatant activities.""z The
court held that for the exception to apply, an act or omission of a government
employee must arise from combatant activity, not a mere supporting function
far removed from the combat theater.'
The significance of the Agent Orange holding is that it firmly placed tortious
behavior by U.S. personnel in the United States--even activity in support of
combat operations-outside the combatant activities exception.
Another district court, in a suit by a deceased soldier's mother over the
Army's failure to properly account for him and care for his remains, held that
"accounting for and identifying soldiers under the exigencies of a combat zone
is a military operation comparable to combat itself" and that therefore such
77. Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. La. 1947).
78. Id. at 374.
79. Id.
80. 170 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1948).
81. Id. at 770.
82. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1255 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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activities fall within the "combatant activities" exception. 5 This case suggests
that U.S. courts will interpret the "combatant activities" component of the
exception broadly as long as the activity is deemed to have occurred in a
combat zone.
The Koohi court followed the same line of reasoning, holding that the
tracking of suspected enemy aircraft and the firing of weapons were combatant
activities, even though no hostile force was actually present:
The conduct of the Vincennes that forms the subject of the plaintiffs' lawsuit is that
involving the tracking, identification, and destruction of unidentified aircraft that
appear to pose a threat to the warship's safety. The firing of a missile in perceived
self-defense is a quintessential combatant activity.'
The combatant activities exception thus immunizes the government from
suits arising from a wide range of activities surrounding combat operations.
Therefore, it has much the same effect as the foreign country exception,"
which will now be discussed only briefly.
3. The "Foreign Country" Exception. The foreign country exception has
been interpreted to preclude claims arising out of tortious acts in any nation not
subject to U.S. sovereignty, even in foreign areas under U.S. military occupa-
tion.8 However, more recent case law has held that the place of injury is not
necessarily controlling: Tortious acts or omissions within the United States do
not enjoy protection under the foreign country exception, even though the
injury occurs abroad. 9 The place of the negligent act or omission, not the
place of the injury, provides the controlling law, and therefore the foreign
country exception does not apply to such cases.90
4. The "Discretionary Function" Exception. The exceptions discussed
above would allow the foreign plaintiff to recover against the United States for
tortious acts committed in the United States, such as orders to carry out
unlawful military operations. The discretionary function exception,91 however,
narrows the scope of possible claims even further. It exempts from the scope
of the FrCA
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
85. Vogelaar v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 1295, 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
86. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Johnson v. United States,
170 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1948)), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988).
88. Occupied Okinawa was deemed to be a foreign country for FTCA purposes, since it would have
violated international conventions to apply U.S. tort law to an occupied part of a foreign country. Cobb
v. United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952). Occupied Saipan was
also considered a foreign country. Brunnell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
89. Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399
F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
90. Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 737-38.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
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to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
92
The discretionary function doctrine has been held to apply to any policy
decision taken by government officials. 93 Only a breach of duty in respect to
the implementation of such policy decisions would be actionable.94 However,
it is difficult to imagine a case in which negligent implementation of a policy
decision in the United States could be a proximate cause of a war crime abroad.
One example might be a failure of the U.S. military services to properly train
mobilizing units in the provisions of the Geneva and Hague Conventions. 95 In
the absence of such negligence within the United States, however, the
discretionary function exception, combined with the foreign country and
combatant activities exceptions, effectively bars tort actions against the United
States for war crimes occurring abroad.
B. The Foreign Claims Act
The FCA96 fills part of the gap left by the foreign country exception to the
FTCA by providing an administrative remedy for claims arising in foreign
countries in peacetime. The FCA empowers the Secretary of Defense to settle
for up to $100,000 any claim arising out of noncombat U.S. military activities in
a foreign country.9 Under the FCA, the military services have implemented
regulations providing for the appointment of Foreign Claims Commissions,
consisting of three officers, which have the authority to investigate claims
immediately and to make settlements of up to $25,000 on their own authority.9 8
The commissions may make investigative findings based on a preponderance of
the evidence, and they need not identify the individual tortfeasor in order to
make a settlement.9
The FCA is widely credited with improving the image of U.S. forces abroad
and increasing the ability of U.S. forces to maintain criminal jurisdiction over
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1973).
94. it.
95. The Hague Convention IV and each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions contain provisions
obliging signatories to incorporate the provisions of the treaties into their respective military training
programs. E.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,
62. The inquiry into the U.S. war crime at My Lai in 1968 identified a deficiency in the implementation
of U.S. law of war training policy during the mobilization of the responsible unit that "played a
significant part" in the occurrence of the tragedy. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 204-05. Since
the Vietnam War, however, the U.S. armed forces have implemented law of war training requirements
to bring them into compliance with the Geneva Conventions. Major Jeffrey F. Addicott & Major
William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139
MIL. L. REv. 153, 181-85 (1993). Therefore, such a cause of action is not likely to arise.
96. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
97. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988).
98. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Warner, Planning for Foreign Claims Operations During Overseas
Deployment of Military Forces, ARMY LAW., July 1987, at 61, 62-63.
99. Id
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U.S. service members stationed abroad. °° When crime victims are compensat-
ed rapidly through administrative proceedings, host-nation prosecutors and
judges are more willing to waive jurisdiction or to impose lighter sentences on
U.S. service members. 10'
The FCA provides no remedy to victims of war crimes, however, because it
specifically excludes claims by nationals of countries unfriendly to the United
States1"2 and claims arising out of combat."l The "arising out of combat"
exception contains its own exception for claims arising "from an accident or
malfunction incident to the operation of an aircraft of the armed forces of the
United States."'O'  However, an "accident or malfunction" would almost
certainly not be defined as a war crime. Therefore, the FCA provides no basis
for relief for victims of war crimes.
C. Actions Against Individual Service Members
Since sovereign immunity would prevent almost all war crime victims from
proceeding against the U.S. government in U.S. courts, victims might instead
proceed against individual U.S. war criminals, if those individuals could be
identified and were solvent. The common law rule once held that governmental
employees were always personally liable for their own torts."0 5 Today, cases
against federal employees must survive possible substitution of the United States
as a defendant under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act of 1988 (the "FELRTCA").'06 The FELRTCA provides
for substitution of the United States as the defendant if the government certifies
that the employee was acting in the "scope of office or employment," or if the
court agrees to make the certification as a finding." In that event, sovereign
immunity would trigger the dismissal of the case, unless the case could survive
the exceptions to the FTCA described above. Substitution under the
FELRTCA would immunize the government employee even though that
substitution, combined with federal immunity, would result in denying the
plaintiff a remedy."l
Therefore, the key prerequisite to a successful suit against a war criminal is
a determination that the criminal was not acting within his "scope of employ-
ment" for purposes of the Act. Since one of the purposes of the FELRTCA
was to bring uniformity to the field of federal employee liability, the applicable
100. E.g., Lieutenant Colonel David P. Stephenson, An Introduction to the Payment of Claims Under
the Foreign and the International Agreement Claims Act, 37 A.F. L. REv. 191, 208 (1994).
101. Id
102. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(b)(2) (1988).
103. Id. § 2734(b)(3).
104. Id
105. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 1056 (5th
ed. 1984).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988).
107. Id. § 2679(d).
108. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160 (1991).
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law for such a determination is the common law of agency." Thus, in
resolving the "scope of employment" question, a court would need to determine
whether a service member's intentionally criminal conduct is imputable to the
government.
Under the traditional rule, masters were not responsible for the intentional
wrongdoing of servants."0 The modem tendency has been to impute some
types of intentional employee wrongdoing to the employer in order to further
the risk-spreading rationale of the respondeat superior doctrine."' The general
test is whether the purpose of the conduct is, at least in part, to further the
interests of the master.12  Thus, where the tort arises directly out of the
servant's performance of his duties, the employer will be held liable."'
However, when the employee's motives are purely personal, the employer will
not be considered liable.114 Some courts have also held that "outrageous"
employee misconduct can be proof that the employee's motive was purely
personal, but that rule has not been uniformly applied."5 Since soldiers in a
combat zone are generally considered to be on duty at all times, it is difficult to
imagine a judicial finding that a soldier in a combat zone acted from "purely
personal" motives.
An additional trend in modem agency law has been to hold employers liable
for any foreseeable employee misconduct on the theory that in most occupation-
al situations, the employer is the best loss avoider.'16 This reasoning certainly
applies to torts arising out of military operations. Another possible basis for
attributing service member misconduct to the government is the common law
"dangerous instrumentalities" doctrine, which holds that a master assumes
liability by the mere act of entrusting the servant with a dangerous instrument
that poses a great risk of harm to others. 7 Although the doctrine is old and
not universally accepted,"' it would certainly seem to be appropriate to
military operations.
Because of the substantial deference usually accorded to military operations,
the peculiar nature of the military profession, and the variety of doctrines
available to justify attributing a service member's actions to the government, a
court is unlikely to find any action by a service member engaged in a combat
operation to be outside the "scope of employment." Therefore, substitution of
the Federal Government as defendant under the FELRTCA in a case involving
war crimes is almost certain.
109. Garcia v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 674, 681 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
110. KEETON ET AL., supra note 105, § 70, at 505.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id at 506.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 504-05.
117. Id. at 507.
118. Id.
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D. The Result: No Remedy for War Crimes Victims
The result achieved by the application of the FICA and the FCA is
certainly ironic: a foreign-born plaintiff suing a former agent of a foreign
government for an international law violation that had no connection to the
United States has a good chance of success in U.S. courts,' 9 but a foreign
victim of a war crime committed by U.S. personnel, or even a victim of a war
crime directed by U.S. leaders, has virtually no chance of succeeding in those
same courts. Moreover, a civilian victim of an accidental bombing may claim
relief under the FCA, but the victim has no basis for FCA relief if the bombing
was an intentional war crime. 2
Although no explicit legislative history exists on the subject, the maze of
FTCA exceptions relating to combat activities abroad makes it likely that
Congress intended to avoid the prospect of enemy nations and their citizens
gaining access to the U.S. civil justice system. Given the massive destruction
and death that can result from even the best-conducted military operations, the
fear of abuse of the court system by foreigners certainly seems valid.121
V
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Opening up the U.S. tort system to foreigners for torts stemming from
military operations poses enormous problems. It is likely that authoritarian or
communist governments of some U.S. military adversaries would seek to strike
back at the United States by encouraging their citizens to sue and by sponsoring
the litigation in U.S. courts. Successful litigants might even have their awards
confiscated by their governments. In this way, the fundamental purpose of the
tort system would be frustrated, and the tort action for war crimes victims would
be discredited, since it would be considered only a political tool for the
governments of vindictive U.S. adversaries. Even if the system were not abused,
the commitment in time and money required for successful U.S. court action
might exclude all but the wealthiest and most patient plaintiffs.
Amending the FELRTCA to allow actions against U.S. individuals would
also do more harm than good. The benefits of such an amendment would be
scant: It would rarely be useful to war crimes victims, since most potential
defendants would not be sufficiently wealthy to satisfy a substantial judgment.
119. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
121. Even in this country, some commentators consider almost any U.S. involvement in combat to
be a war crime, regardless of whether the U.S. military committed any act proscribed by international
law. See generally RAMSEY CLARK, THE FIRE THIS TIME: U.S. WAR CRIMES iN THE GULF (1992);
compare Major Ariane L. De Saussure, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During the Persian Gulf
War: An Overview, 37 A.F. L. REv. 41, 58-68 (1994). Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine hostile
foreign governments using poorly supported war crimes allegations as a pretext to abuse the U.S. court
system.
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On the other hand, the dangers of creating civil war crimes liability for
individual U.S. service members would be great. Exposing service members to
personal tort liability to foreigners might undermine military discipline by
encouraging individual soldiers to disobey orders on the pretext of avoiding
potential lawsuits. The prospect of tort liability also might prevent soldiers from
fighting aggressively enough to win on the battlefield. Moreover, amending the
FELRTCA could expose leaders at all levels of command to agency liability for
the actions of war criminals, whether or not those leaders were in a position to
prevent the crimes.
However, as stated at the outset of this note,122 there are good reasons to
provide foreign victims of U.S. war crimes with some sort of remedy. The
successful experience of the FCA demonstrates the benefits of providing foreign
nationals with a quick, efficient administrative remedy for torts committed by
U.S. forces.1" Therefore, an obvious solution is to enact a variation of the
FCA"4 or to amend the FCA itself to enable victims of U.S. war crimes to
seek compensation regardless of their nationality or whether the injury resulted
from combat operations.
Various benefits would accrue from the creation of a permanent system for
war crimes compensation by the U.S. government. Granted, expanding the
FCA to include war crimes victims in "unfriendly" states would mean additional
budget expenditures, but assuming that the claim limits are similar to those of
the current FCA, the expenditure would not be an enormous burden."2 The
existence of claims by war crimes victims would provide a constant reminder to
lawmakers and military officials that aggressive measures are necessary to
prevent war crimes. Such preventive measures might include placing more
emphasis on law of war training for military personnel, including legal staff
officers in the planning of combat operations in brigade or battalion-sized
units, 26 and incorporating prisoners of war and civilians into training exercises
on a more frequent basis." More importantly, the presence of such a remedy
122. See supra parts I and II.
123. Supra note 100 and accompanying text.
124. See infra part IV.
125. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
126. Current U.S. Army organization, for example, provides for only one Judge Advocate General's
Corps operational lawyer at the divisional level. Addicott & Hudson, supra note 95, at 183. This
lawyer provides the only operational law supervision for the division, which contains at least 20
subordinate combat unit staffs. Some war crimes arise from faulty operations plans at lower levels of
command. Id at 168-69. Assigning operational law specialists to lower levels of command might
prevent such violations. The Air Force assigns operational lawyers at the air wing level, and the
benefits in terms of operational law awareness and compliance have been substantial. Interview with
Scott L. Silliman, Executive Director, Duke University Center of Law, Ethics, and National Security,
in Durham, N.C. (Sept. 1994).
127. U.S. Army light infantry units participate in regular law-of-war training, which is integrated into
their field exercises. Marc L. Warren, Enforcing the Third Geneva Convention: the United States Army
Approach 3-5 (March 10, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). However, it is the
author's personal experience that law of war instruction is rarely integrated into the training of U.S.
Army mechanized units.
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would provide compensation for those injured by U.S. violations of the law of
war.
Of course, an administrative system would not be the answer for all potential
war crimes victims. Many victims, especially victims of illegal aerial bombard-
ment, might be far from the nearest U.S. claims commission and thus unable to
present a claim. During periods of intense combat, it might be nearly
impossible for U.S. investigators to substantiate even the most meritorious
claims. The victim's government, engaged in combat against U.S. forces, might
be unwilling to cooperate. Despite these shortcomings, an administrative system
modeled on the FCA is probably the best solution available. Through such a
system, the U.S. could compensate those most likely to suffer from war crimes
committed by U.S. troops: inhabitants of U.S.-occupied enemy territory and
individuals under U.S. custody, such as prisoners and internees.
Other writers have suggested that a domestic war crimes prosecution
apparatus, separate from the Department of Defense, would be the best way to
ensure U.S. compliance with the laws of war."2  While an independent
criminal prosecution system might help enforce compliance with the law of war,
a criminal system would not provide compensation to victims, nor would it
provide comfort to those victims whose cases are not pursued by the prosecution
authority, which might be influenced by domestic political pressures and
resource limitations. Therefore, many victims would have no practical method
to seek justice and compensation. A provision for an effective civil claims
mechanism for foreign war crimes victims, in addition to the diligent criminal




Many people question the need for a compensation system intended to
benefit citizens of hostile nations. After all, war is deadly and destructive
business, and many fall victim to its ravages. Why should we single out victims
of war crimes for special status? 29 The answer to this question is straightfor-
ward. We should compensate war crime victims because the United States
prides itself on its adherence to the rule of law. If the United States truly
desires to conduct its military operations in a spirit of justice and benevolence,
there is little room for law of war violations, and we should not tolerate the
existence of legions of aggrieved war crimes victims unable to gain justice
128. In the aftermath of the My Lai controversy, it was proposed that the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia be vested with jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen accused of war crimes, and that
the Department of Justice assume prosecution responsibilities. GoLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at
11-15.
129. This question was raised most recently in the opinion in Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328,
1334-35 (9th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S.Ct. 2928 (1993). See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying
text.
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against the very nation which professes to dispense that commodity in the
international sphere.
If the U.S. military continues to carry out combat operations with the
discipline and consideration for international law that characterized the Persian
Gulf operation,"3 tort liability for war crimes should not be a major concern.
The presence of the remedy, however, would demonstrate to the world and to
U.S. citizens that the United States is serious about adhering to the rule of law
in its conduct of military operations.
130. U.S. military leaders, acutely conscious of the U.S. military's previous failures in the area of
humanitarian law compliance in Southeast Asia, made great efforts during the Gulf War to minimize
law of war violations. E.g., Army Teaches Gulf Soldiers How to Avoid My Lai-Type Massacre,
Pittsburgh Press, Feb. 24, 1991, at A9. As a result, the Allied Coalition's campaign to liberate Kuwait
was probably one of the best examples in military history of compliance with the law of war. For
instance, officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which monitored U.S. prisoner of
war camps, told U.S. military police officials that their treatment of Iraqi prisoners was the best
compliance with the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention in history. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 620 (1992); see also De
Saussere, supra note 121, at 58-68. For a conflicting view of the Coalition's law of war compliance,
albeit one influenced by Iraqi propaganda, see CLARK, supra note 121.

